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Abstract
On February 27-28, 1998, the Center on European Union Law of the Fordham Law School
was pleased to present a program, “The European Union and the United States: Constitutional
Systems in Evolution,” intended to provide a clear description of the impact of the Treaty of Amsterdam upon the European Union (or “EU”), and to enable some valuable points of comparison
and contrast between constitutional and legal developments within the European Union and the
United States. This symposium issue of the Fordham International Law Journal publishes a series
of papers presented at the conference centering on the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on October 2,
1997, and scheduled for complete ratification and entry into effect in 1999. All of the articles were
written by present or former officials of institutions of the European Union who either participated
in the preparation of the text of the Treaty of Amsterdam or are well-suited to analyze it. Let me
now make a few remarks situating the Treaty of Amsterdam within the context of the constitutional
evolution of the European Union. Not only is the study of the European Union one of the greatest
practical importance, in view of its major political and economic role on the world stage, but also
it is fascinating and rather elusive. The historical development of the European Union is complex,
representing a gradual expansion in scope and power through a number of stages, each of which
in turn is rather complicated and hard to assess.

INTRODUCTION
THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:
INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM
Rogerj Goebel*
On February 27-28, 1998, the Center on European Union
Law of the Fordham Law School was pleased to present a program, "The European Union and the United States: Constitutional Systems in Evolution," intended to provide a clear description of the impact of the Treaty of Amsterdam' upon the European Union (or "EU"), and to enable some valuable points of
comparison and contrast between constitutional and legal developments within the European Union and the United States.
The conference proceedings are to be published in a book by
Kluwer Law International later this year.
This symposium issue of the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal publishes a series of papers presented at the conference centering on the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on October 2, 1997,
and scheduled for complete ratification and entry into effect in
1999. All of the articles were written by present or former officials of institutions of the European Union who either participated in the preparation of the text of the Treaty of Amsterdam
or are well-suited to analyze it.
Commissioner Marcelino Oreja, whose portfolio included a
direct responsibility for the Commission's participation in the
Turin Intergovernmental Conference, which drafted the Treaty
of Amsterdam, inaugurates the symposium with his reflections
on the achievements of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the prospects
of further enlargement of the European Union, and their impact on relations between the European Union and the United
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center on European Union Law, Fordham
University School of Law.
1. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C
340/1 (1997) (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
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States. His paper is entitled: The Recent Evolution of the European
Union.
Five experts coming from each of the institutions have provided articles intended to yield an analytical overview of the
Treaty of Amsterdam. Jean-Claude Piris, Director-General of the
Legal Service of the Council of the European Union and Legal
Advisor to the Intergovernmental Conference (or "IGC"), collaborated with his Legal Service colleague, Giorgio Maganza, to
write The Treaty of Amsterdam: Overview and Institutional Aspects.
This article provides a realistic, authoritative, and balanced appraisal of the impact of the Treaty of Amsterdam on the EU institutions and upon the scope of EU operations.
Michel Petite, a key Commission civil servant who participated intimately in the IGC discussions, has provided an article,
The Commission's Role in the IGC's Drafting the Treaty of Amsterdam,
that evaluates in a very frank manner the major issues and the
Commission's contributions to the efforts to resolve them.
Member of the European Parliament Laurens Jan Brinkhorst's
article, An Appraisal of the Treaty of Amsterdam from the Perspectiveof
a Member of the EuropeanParliament,provides a pragmatic critique
of the Treaty of Amsterdam's achievements. His comments not
only are flavored by his views as an Member of European Parliament, but also benefit from his past experience as Director-General of the Commission Directorate General responsible for environmental protection and consumer rights, and from his earlier
service representing the Netherlands within the Council. Finally, Ole Due, former President of the Court of Justice, in his
article, The Impact of the Amsterdam Treaty upon the Court ofJustice,
gives a magisterial analysis of the Treaty of Amsterdam's provisions enlarging the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice (or
"Court"). He also remarks on the fortunate failure of Court critics during the IGC to achieve any reduction in the Court's role.
One of the most important substantive aspects of the Treaty
of Amsterdam is its reshaping of the Social Policy Chapter and
its creation of an Employment Title. Patrick Venturini, Counselor in the Directorate General on Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs, has written an able description of the
new Treaty's achievements in this sector in Social Policy and Employment Aspects of the Treaty of Amsterdam. He also describes the
ongoing efforts of the European Council to make the new employment provisions take on a realistic form.
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Two major recent developments in EU law have been the
elaboration of the principles of subsidiarity and transparency,
both intended in large measure to bring the European Union
closer to its citizens. Christian Timmermans, Deputy Director
General of the Commission Legal Service, has done an admirable job in analyzing the evolution and the content of both concepts. In his article Subsidiarity and Transparency, he outlines the
efforts of the Commission and other institutions to provide concrete dimensions both to the principle of subsidiarity and that of
transparency and notes the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam intended to reinforce these efforts. Laurens Brinkhorst,
very much interested in particular by the efforts to provide the
European peoples with greater access to information about institutional operations and decisions, has critiqued this topic in his
article, Transparency in the European Union.
The final articles in the symposium deal with another extremely important topic, the impact of the Treaty of Amsterdam
on the foreign relations of the European Union. Ambassador
Hugo Paemen, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to the United States and formerly the Commission civil
servant overseeing the negotiations leading to the present World
Trade Organization, leads off with an excellent article, The European Union in InternationalAffairs: Recent Developments. Ambassador Paemen provides a thorough analytical review of the recent
evolution of the European Community's external trade powers
and of the somewhat limited amendment to Article 113 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community2 ("EC Treaty")
contained in the Treaty of Amsterdam, as well as a description of
the complex structure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Jacques Bourgeois, professor at the College of Europe and a
leading Brussels practitioner, formerly a senior member of the
Commission Legal Service, brings his accumulated experience
and expertise to bear in his article, External Relations Powers of the
2. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. 224/1 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporatingchanges made by Treaty on
European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union (or "TEU") amended the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter
EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2
C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA].
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European Community. Mr. Bourgeois concentrates on the thorny
issue of the extent of the Community's external relations competence within the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), in particular after the well-known Court of Justice Opinion 1/94 on the
proper mode of conclusion of the Uruguay Round Agreements.3
Finally, Giorgio Maganza provides a second paper to the
symposium, this time The Treaty of Amsterdam's Changes to the Common Foreign and Security Policy Chapterand an Overview of the Opening Enlargement Process. His article describes the somewhat modest modifications made by the Treaty of Amsterdam in the structure and operations of the Common Foreign and Security Policy,
created by the Treaty on European Union 4 (or "TEU," "Treaty of
Maastricht," or "Maastricht Treaty"). He also describes the
launching of negotiations with five Central European countries
and with Cyprus for their eventual accession to the European
Union, a process that will undoubtedly necessitate further important modifications to the Treaty on European Union.
Let me now make a few remarks situating the Treaty of Amsterdam within the context of the constitutional evolution of the
European Union. Not only is the study of the European Union
one of the greatest practical importance, in view of its major
political and economic role on the world stage, but also it is fascinating and rather elusive. The historical development of the
European Union is complex, representing a gradual expansion
in scope and power through a number of stages, each of which
in turn is rather complicated and hard to assess.
I. ISSUES RELATING TO ENLARGEMENT
The core of the European Union, and still by far its most
significant component, is the European Community, formerly
known as the European Economic Community ("EEC"), created
in 1958 by the Treaty of Rome of March 25, 1957 (or "EEC
Treaty").' The European Community's historical progress has
been marked both by expansion in the number of Member
States, from the original six to the present fifteen, and by three
major revisions in treaty structure and scope-the Treaty of Amsterdam being the third such revision.
3. Opinion 1/94, [1994] E.C.R. 1-5267, [1995] 1 C.M.L.R. 205.
4. TEU, supra note 2.
5. EEC Treaty, supra note 2.
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The negotiations for the first enlargement of the European
Community in 1972, adding the United Kingdom, Denmark,
and Ireland to the initial six continental States (Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), undoubtedly raised more difficult issues than any subsequent accession has done. This was because the incremental change from
six to nine constituted a fifty percent increase in Community
membership. From the outset, the negotiations were conducted
on the basis that the applicant countries had to accept the acquis
communautaire.6 This key concept, never successfully translated
into English, means essentially that applicants must accept the
Community's institutional structure, scope, and political objectives, as well as the major constitutional doctrines of the Court of
Justice.
At the famous Hague Summit on December 1-2, 1969, the
Heads of Government and State declared that: "In so far as the
applicant States accept the Treaties and their political objective,
[and] the decisions taken since the entry into force of the Treaties," the negotiations could commence.7 Accordingly, the principle of the acquis communautaire became an authoritativelystated condition for the first enlargement and subsequently for
any future accession.
Thus, at the time of the first enlargement in 1973, based
upon the text of the 1972 Act of Accession,' the acquis communautaire could be analyzed as comprising six constituent elements: 1) the Treaties, 2) the institutional structure under the
Treaties, 3) the legislation and other acts of the Community,
4) international agreements entered into by the Community,
5) legislation and other acts adopted during the negotiations,
and 6) the somewhat vague concept of the "political objective"
of the Treaties. In its Opinion prior to the Act of Accession,9 the
Commission added a seventh element, the "legal order" of the
6. My analysis of the meaning of acquis communautaire as the concept has evolved
during the various accessions is contained in RogerJ. Goebel, The European Union Grows:
The ConstitutionalImpact of the Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FoRDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1092, 1140-57 (1995). For additional analysis, see Carlo Curti Gialdino, Some Reflections on the Acquis Communuataire, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1089 (1995).
7. Final Communiqu6 of the Conference Heads of State or Government on 1 and
2 December 1969 at the Hague, in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THIRD
GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTRTIES OF THE COMMUNITIES 1969, annex, at 489 (1970).
8. 1972 Act of Accession, arts. 2-5, J.O. L 73/1, at 14-15 (1972).
9. Opinion of the Commission of 19 January 1972 on the Applications for Acces-
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Community, including the principles of the direct applicability
of certain Treaty provisions, the primacy of Community law over
any conflicting national provisions, and the uniform interpretation of Community law-all major doctrines developed by the
Court of Justice in the early years of Community law.
Not only in the first enlargement, but also in the subsequent
accession negotiations for Greece, Portugal, and Spain, admitted
in the 1980s, and for Austria, Finland, and Sweden, admitted in
1995, the new States all formally accepted the acquis communautaire. Moreover, the European Council's famous Declaration on Democracy at Copenhagen on April 7-8, 1978, effectively
expanded the acquis communautaire to include adherence by applicant countries to the "principles of representative democracy,
of the rule of law, of social justice and of respect for human
rights."'10
The 1993 Treaty of Maastricht incorporated the concept of
the acquis communautaireas a key aspect of the European Union.
Article B sets forth the objectives of the Union, ending the list
with: "to maintain in full the acquis communautaire and build on
it."" In addition, the first paragraph of Article C states: "The
Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which
shall ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities
carried out in order to attain its objectives while respecting and
building upon the acquis communautaire."12 Several of the symposium articles lay emphasis on the continued respect for the acquis communautaire that is manifested in aspects of the Treaty of
Amsterdam, and as an essential premise in future negotiations
with the applicant Central European nations.
Obviously, each time the European Community (now a consion of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom, fifth reci-

tal, J.O. L 73/3 (1972).
10. 11 E.C. BULL., no. 3, at 5-6 (1978).
11. TEU, supra note 2, art. B, O.J. C'224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 727.
By virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam, articles of the TEU will be renumbered in the
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union ("Consolidated TEU"). Treaty
of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 12, O.J. C 340/1, at 78-79 (1997). The Treaty of Amsterdam will renumber Article B of the TEU as Article 2 of the Consolidated TEU. See
Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 2, O.J. C 340/2, at 152
(1997), 37 I.L.M. 67, 68 (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Consolidated TEU] (art. B of
TEU), incorporatingchanges made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra.
12. TEU, supra note 2, art. C, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 72728 (art. C of TEU will be numbered as art. 3 of Consolidated TEU).
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stitutional part of the European Union) has been enlarged to
include new Member States, a certain modification in institutional structure has occurred. The increase in numbers of the
Members of the Commission, the Members of the European Parliament, and the Judges of the Court of Justice, all to reflect the
addition of new States, never posed any great problem in past
enlargements, but, as noted below, is now becoming an issue in
the prospective enlargement of the European Union to include
many Central European countries. The Parliament has been
able to set a ceiling on its total potential membership, namely
700 MEPs, and this figure has been accepted in the Treaty of
Amsterdam. In contrast, thus far the Member States have not
been able to agree on whether to keep the practice of permitting
each Member State to nominate one Commissioner, with two
Commissioners each for France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the
United Kingdom, or to limit the size of the Commission with a
view to achieving greater operational efficiency. Likewise, the
Member States have not yet decided whether to continue to permit each to nominate one Judge on the Court of Justice and on
the Court of First Instance, or to limit the number of judges to
prevent the two courts from becoming unwieldy deliberative assemblies. These issues should be satisfactorily addressed before
the current negotiations for the admission of six new countries
are complete.
Any change in the mode of voting for legislation and other
decisions within the Council of Ministers (now formally known
as the Council of the European Union) has often been the subject of controversy when new States join. Obviously, the more
Member States that there are, the more difficult it is to achieve a
consensus when legislations or decisions must be reached by
unanimity. Hence, as noted below, successive Treaty amendments have reduced the number of fields in which measures are
adopted by unanimous action.
Especially now that most legislation-probably over ninety
percent-is adopted by a form of voting known as qualified majority voting (or "QMV"), rather than by unanimous action, the
topic has become extremely sensitive. The qualified voting system is a bit arcane. From the inception of the EEC Treaty, the
Member States have set a number of weighted votes for each of
them, to be used when qualified majority voting is the prescribed
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Treaty mechanism.1" France, Germany, Italy, and the United
Kingdom have always held the maximum weighted figure, ten
votes each. As the next largest state, Spain has eight votes, while
the medium-sized and smaller states have five, four, or three
votes, and Luxembourg has only two votes. These numbers were
set in an attempt to take into account each Member State's population and economic power, but only in part. The system obviously gives the smaller and medium-sized Member States a disproportionate vote in comparison with the five largest Member
States. If population alone were decisive, Germany should have
over 200 weighted votes to Luxembourg's one. Still, while not
perfectly democratic, the system is manifestly far more sensible
and fair than the United States' constitutionally mandated parity
of two Senate seats each for both very large and very small states.
It is easy to see that the Heads of State and Government
regard it as essential to set a qualified voting majority at somewhere around the two-thirds mark in order to ensure that a sufficiently large number of Member States back a measure before it
can be adopted. On the other hand, the larger Member States
clearly do not relish being outvoted. Consequently, they have
always sought to have the requisite qualified majority vote to be
set at a level at which it is unlikely that too many large Member
States can be outvoted.14 The key issue is, of course: how many
is too many? As the articles of Messrs. Piris, Maganza, and Petite
describe in some detail, it was hoped that the Treaty of Amsterdam might modify the present qualified majority voting structure in the Council in order to accommodate a large number of
13. The number of weighted votes for each Member State, and the requisite majority for action, is set out in Article 148 of the Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"). EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 148, O.J. C 224/1, at 58 (1992), [1992]
1 C.M.L.R. at 680-81. By virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam, articles of the EC Treaty
will be renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Community ("Consolidated EC Treaty"). Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art.
12, O.J. C 340/1, at 78-79 (1997). The Treaty of Amsterdam will renumber Article 148
of the EC Treaty as Article 205 of the Consolidated EC Treaty. See Consolidated version
of the Treaty establishing the European Community, art. 205, OJ. C 340/3, at 264-65
(1997), 37 I.L.M. 79, 121-22 (not yet ratified) [hereinafter Consolidated EC Treaty]
(art. 148 of EC Treaty), incorporatingchanges made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra.
14. For a discussion of the debate among the Member States at the time of accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden concerning the determination of the current requisite 62 vote majority, together with the Council resolution called theJoanina Compromise of March 26-27, 1994, reflecting a political agreement on the use of the new
weighted majority vote, see Goebel, supra note 6, at 1124-26.
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new and relatively small Member States from Central Europe,
but that unfortunately did not happen. This issue, then, awaits
future resolution.
II. THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT
It would take too long to trace here the developmental
threads of the late 1970s and early 1980s, but the definite historical landmark from which the European Community has moved
forward in its recent revisions of structure is the Solemn Declaration on European Union adopted by the European Council at
Stuttgart in June 1983.15 This declaration affirms the desire "to
achieve a comprehensive and coherent common political approach" to the goal of European Union. 6
The first constitutional fruit of the Solemn Declaration was
the Single European Act 1 7 (or "SEA"), produced by the Luxembourg Intergovernmental Conference in the fall of 1985, and
formally effective after ratification on July 1, 1987. As in the case
of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, an Intergovernmental Conference, composed of representatives of all the Member
States, drafted most of the new Treaty text, but final essential
compromises and additions were made by the Heads of State
and Government, meeting in the composition of the European
Council.' 8
The two most important features of the Single European
Act related to the institutional structure and scope of the Community. For the first time, the Parliament received a significant
share in the legislative process for most internal market measures, through a mode of action called the cooperation procedure. 9 The SEA also made Council decision-making easier and
15. 16 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 24-29 (1983).
16. Id. at 24.
17. SEA, supra note 2. The peculiar title, Single European Act ("SEA"), was given
to it because it not only amended the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, supra note 2, but also formally created both the European Council, infra note
22, and a mechanism for inter-governmental cooperation in foreign affairs, the European Political Cooperation, which subsequently evolved into the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, infra note 29.
18. 18 E.C. BULL., no. 11, at 18-21 (1985).
19. The current description of the cooperation procedure is contained in Article
189c of the EC Treaty. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189c, O.J. C 224/1, at 66-67 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 696-97 (art. 189c of EC Treaty will be renumbered as art. 252 of
Consolidated EC Treaty). Where the procedure is applicable, the Council acts by quali-
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more effective by transferring many fields of action from unanimous voting to qualified majority voting. 20 The SEA further facilitated the functioning of the Court of Justice by enabling the
creation of its accessory body, the Court of First Instance. 21 The
SEA also gave formal treaty recognition to the regular summit
meetings of the Heads of State and Government, called the European Council since the late 1970s, describing its role to be to
"define the general political guidelines" of the Community. 22 Finally, the SEA gave Treaty force to the goal of completing the
internal market by December 31, 1992,23 a decision that greatly
enhanced the subsequent political drive to adopt legislation to
achieve the single market.
In operation, the Single European Act proved itself to be an
fled majority voting. By an absolute majority vote, the Parliament may amend a draft
legislative proposal that has received initial Council approval called a "Council common
position." The Commission then revises the draft, either accepting or rejecting Parliament's amendments. The Council may accept the Commission's draft by a qualified
majority vote, but must vote unanimously if it wishes to amend the draft. Parliament
then has a considerable influence, but not an equal share, in the process of adopting
legislation through the cooperation procedure.
20. The principal field of use of qualified majority voting after the adoption of the
SEA was in the passage of virtually all the directives intended to achieve the completion
of the internal market. Article 100a of the EC Treaty, OJ. C 224/1, at 32 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 633-34 (art. 100a of EC Treaty will be renumbered as art. 95 of
Consolidated EC Treaty), authorized the adoption of such measures by the use of the
cooperation procedure described above, see supra note 19.
21. Article 168a of the EC Treaty, which was added by the SEA, created the Court
of First Instance and authorized the Council to set the Court's jurisdiction. Id. art.
168a, O.J. C 224/1, at 61 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 685-86 (art. 168a of EC Treaty
will be renumbered as art. 225 of Consolidated EC Treaty). The Court of First Instance
presently acts as a court of appeal, reviewing Commission decisions in competition proceedings when appealed by persons or enterprises, reviewing Community institution
staff cases when appealed by Community civil servants, and reviewing anti-dumping and
anti-subsidy regulations when appealed by interested parties. An appeal can be taken
on questions of law, but not of fact, from Court of First Instance judgments to the Court
of Justice.
22. The composition and the role of the European Council in the language added
by the SEA is presently contained in Article D of the TEU. TEU, supra note 2, art. D,
O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 728 (art. C of TEU will be renumbered
as art. 4 of Consolidated TEU). Note that the President of the Commission joins the
Heads of State or Government in European Council meetings. The TEU does not give
the European Council any formal capacity to take binding legal acts, but its decisions
and resolutions are invariably implemented when appropriate by Council or Commission decisions.
23. SEA, supra note 2, art. 13, OJ. L 169/1, at 7 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. at 747
(inserting art. 8a into EEC Treaty). Article 8a of the EEC Treaty was renumbered as
Article 7a of the EC Treaty by the TEU and will be renumbered again as Article 14 of
the Consolidated EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam.
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almost unqualified success. It is true that initially Parliament was
not happy with the SEA, which many members regarded as only
a half-way house on the road to Parliament's more far-reaching
aspirations, and authoritative commentators voiced serious criticisms of the compromises embodied in the SEA.24 In practice,
however, the use of the cooperation procedure not only augmented substantially the power of Parliament, but also is generally credited with improving the quality of legislation. The shift
to qualified majority voting in the Council for almost all internal
market legislation enabled a vast body of new rules to be
adopted, many of them in fields where the former requirement
for unanimous Council decisions had blocked progress for
years.2 5 Moreover, the Court of First Instance has developed
into a judicial body with manifest power and reputation, while
alleviating the caseload burden of the Court of Justice. Finally,
undoubtedly most prominent in the public eye was the success
of the internal market program.
III. THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT
The definite operational efficiencies produced by the Single
European Act and the manifest success of the internal market
program led to a willingness of the Member States, incited in no
small measure by the leadership of the Commission under its
dynamic President, Jacques Delors, to undertake a more farreaching Treaty revision. The June 1990 Dublin European
Council meeting decided that the time was ripe for two intergovernmental conferences composed of Member State representatives, to be held in Rome beginning in December 1990, one to
work on political modifications, the other to develop a frame24. The most weighty criticism of the SEA came from Judge Pierre Pescatore, a
leading constitutional scholar and influential member of the Court ofJustice from 1966
to 1984. Pierre Pescatore, Some Critical Remarks on the "Single EuropeanAct," 24 COMMON

MKT. L. REv. 9 (1987); see Nicholas Forwood & Mark Clough, The Single EuropeanAct and
Free Movement, 11 EUR. L. REv. 383 (1986). For analytical but favorable analyses of the
SEA, see George Bermann, The Single European Act: A New Constitutionfor the Community?, 27 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 529 (1989); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The Internal

Market Following the Single European Act, 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 361 (1987); Hans
Joachim Glaesner, The Single,European Act: Attempt at an Appraisal, 10 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 446 (1986-1987).
25. By the end of 1992, over 95% of the legislative program set by the Commission's June 1985 White Paper on completing the Internal Market had been finally
adopted. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TwENTY-SIXTH GENERAL REPORT
ON THE ACrIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1992, at 35 (1993).
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work for an eventual economic and monetary union. 2 6 The two
conferences worked intensively for one full year, reporting back
to and receiving instructions and proposals from the Member
State governments, as well as receiving proposals and comments
from the Commission and the Parliament. When the conferences were unable to attain agreement on certain key questions,
the Maastricht European Council in December 1991 somewhat
surprisingly managed to work out acceptable compromises on
27
most of the unsettled issues.
Although often misunderstood as creating a European
Union, Article A of the Maastricht Treaty makes clear that the
Treaty is really still on the road, constituting "a new stage in the
process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe. '28 Even so, the Maastricht Treaty represents the most
important restructuring of the institutions and expansion of the
constitutional dimensions of the Community since its inception.
Indeed, the Maastricht Treaty has given a new name to the overall structure, the European Union, and has replaced the traditional term, European Economic Community, by the pithier
one, European Community. In fact, the European Community,
often called the "first pillar," represents virtually all of the European Union's institutional structure and scope of operations, including the new Economic and Monetary Union. The parts of
the European Union that remain outside of the Community are
comprised of the other two "pillars," Article J, the Common Foreign and Security Policy,2" and Article K, Cooperation in Justice
and Home Affairs,"0 which have their own scope and decisionmaking procedures. Although the ratification process proved
surprisingly arduous, especially in Denmark, France, Germany,
and the United Kingdom, the Treaty of Maastricht ultimately en26. 23 E.C. BULL., no. 6, at 7-10 (1990). The principal agenda items for the two
Rome Intergovernmental Conferences were laid down by the European Council at its
Rome meeting on December 14-15, 1990. 23 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 7-11 (1990).
27. 24 E.C. BULL., no. 12, at 7-8 (1991).
28. TEU, supra note 2, art. A, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 72627 (art. A of TEU will be renumbered as art. 1 of Consolidated TEU). The first recital
of the TEU's Preamble also refers to the TEU as "a new stage in the process of European integration undertaken with the establishment of the European Communities."
Id., first recital, O.J. C 224/1, at 2 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 725.
29. Id. arts. J-J.11, o.J. C 224/1, at 94-96 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 729-34 (arts.
J-J.11 of TEU will be renumbered as tit. V, arts. 11-28 of Consolidated TEU).
30. Id. arts. K-KI9, O.J. C 224/1, at 97-98 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 735-38 (arts.
K-K.9 of TEU will be renumbered as tit. VI, arts. 29-45 of Consolidated TEU).
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tered into force on November 1, 1993.31
The formal name of the Treaty of Maastricht is the Treaty
on European Union.3 2 The United Kingdom's opposition to the
use of the adjective "federal" prevented the adoption of the
name "European Federal Union," but, objectively speaking,
there can be no doubt that the present structure represents a
federal constitutional system. In the words of the leading
scholar on this subject, Judge Koen' Lenaerts, the European
Union can be described as a constitutional form of "integrative
federalism." 3
Although by far its most important component is the European Community, the European Union's two other structures of
intergovernmental cooperation, namely the Common Foreign
and Security Policy and Cooperation injustice and Home Affairs
have known a period of considerable development from 1993 to
1998. However, manifest operational difficulties in both these
intergovernmental systems led to a willingness of the Member
States to consider, and in some instances to adopt, major revisions. In their articles, Messrs. Piris, Maganza, and Petite discuss
the complicated transmutation by the Treaty of Amsterdam of
most fields of action within the current Cooperation in Justice
and Home Affairs into new provisions for Community legislative
action. Ambassador Paemen and Mr. Maganza similarly discuss
the more modest improvements made by the Amsterdam Treaty
to cooperative decision-making under the Common Foreign and
Security Policy.
In institutional terms, the most far-reaching attainment of
31. For a brief description of the ratification process and its difficulties, see Goebel, supra note 6, at 1110-13.
32. The achievements, compromises, and complexity of the Maastricht Treaty on
European Union have provoked a voluminous literature, too numerous for citation
here. Two fine constitutional law surveys are 2 INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION (Deirdre Curtin et al. eds., 1994), and LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MAASTRICHT
TEATY (David O'Keefe & Patrick Twomey eds., 1994).
33. Judge Lenaerts of the Court of First Instance, who continues to be Professor on
the Leuven University Law Faculty, an exceptionally fine comparative constitutional law
scholar, has treated the topic of "federal" character of the European Union most recently in Federalism: Essential Concepts in Evolution-The Case of the European Union, 21
FoRDHtAm INT'L L.J. 746 (1998). His prior article was Constitutionalismand the Many Faces
of Federalism,38 AM.J. CoMp. L. 205, 206 (1990). My own contribution to the literature
is contained in Roger J. Goebel, The European Community and Eastern Europe: 'Deepening'
and 'Widening' the Community Brand of Economic Federalism, 1 NEw EUR. L. REv. 163

(1993).
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the Treaty of Maastricht was the creation of a new legislative process, the co-decision procedure, 4 which gave the Parliament
close to an equal share with the Council in adopting internal
market legislation. 5 The co-decision procedure largely supplanted the cooperation procedure, although the latter survived
in some fields of action. At the Council level, the co-decision
procedure mandates qualified majority voting.
The co-decision process has two essential features. First, if
the Council and Parliament are unable to agree upon the text of
legislation when Parliament has proposed amendments to the
Council draft, then a Conciliation Committee representing the
two bodies intervenes in an effort to achieve a compromise. The
role of the Conciliation Committee resembles the role of Conference Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the United States. The Conciliation Committee cannot
bind either body, but does usually determine the text of any legislation eventually adopted. Second, if the Council and Parliament are unable to reach a compromise, then the Parliament
can veto the legislation. The veto power is not absolute in practice, however, because the Council can still vote a final time in
favor of its text, which is then adopted unless the Parliament
votes against the Council proposal by an absolute majority-a
negative vote, which is not usually easy to attain.
The co-decision process is presently used to adopt a substantial volume of legislation, most notably the harmonization of
rules to achieve the internal market, as well as the measures to
achieve the free movement of workers or the right of establishment, 6 and measures in the more recent fields of European
Community action, namely, education, culture, public health,
37
and consumer protection.
34. To supplement the brief description of this procedure in the text, see the excellent analysis by Professor Alan Dashwood of Cambridge, formerly in the Legal Service of the Council, namely, Community Legislative Procedures in the Era of the Treaty on
European Union, 19 EUR. L. Rxv. 343 (1994).
35. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 100a, OJ. C 224/1, at 32 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 633-34 (art. 100a of EC Treaty will be renumbered as art. 95 of Consolidated EC Treaty).
36. Id. arts. 49, 54, OJ. C 224/1, at 21, 22 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612, 614-15
(arts. 49 and 54 of EC Treaty will be renumbered as arts. 40 and 43 of Consolidated EC
Treaty, respectively).
37. Id. arts. 126, 128, 129, 129a, O.J. C 224/1, at 46-47, 47, 48, 48 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 660, 661-62, 662-63, 663 (arts. 126, 128, 129, and 129a of EC Treaty will be
renumbered as arts. 149, 151, 152, and 153 of Consolidated EC Treaty, respectively).
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Because the co-decision procedure has Worked quite well in
practice, and because the Parliament has continued to press its
case for greater powers in order to provide increased democratic
legitimacy to the Union, the Treaty of Amsterdam will modify
the co-decision procedure to give Parliament a completely equal
share in the procedure.3 8 The Council will no longer have a final chance to adopt its initial text. Moreover, the cooperation
procedure is to be essentially replaced everywhere by co-decision. Several of the symposium authors discuss at greater length
the importance of this political development.
In terms of scope, the most important achievement of the
Maastricht Treaty was to set out complicated provisions for the
creation of an Economic and Monetary Union.3 9 Indeed, the
successful progress on this vital augmentation of the scope of the
European Community (the Monetary Union is an integral part
of the European Community and is not a separate intergovernmental "pillar") undoubtedly influenced the progress made in
the IGC that drafted the Treaty of Amsterdam. However, as
Messrs. Piris and Maganza note, the European Council excluded
the Economic and Monetary Union provisions from the agenda
of the IGC, so the Treaty of Amsterdam does not touch this subject.
Undoubtedly, the most important compromise reached in
the Maastricht European Council was to permit, by use of a Social Protocol,4 ° all of the Member States except the United King38. The new provision setting out the co-decision procedure after the Treaty of
Amsterdam is ratified will be Article 251 of the Consolidated EC Treaty, replacing the
present Article 189b of the EC Treaty. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art.
2(44), O.J. 340/1, at 45-46 (1997) (replacing art. 189b of EC Treaty); see Consolidated
EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 251, O.J. C 340/3, at 279-80 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 129 (art.
189b of EC Treaty).
39. The best single reference source for a detached analysis of the Economic and
Monetary Union ("EMU") provisions of the Treaty is RENE SMITS, THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK-INSTITUTIONAL AsPEcrS (1997). The late Jorn Pipkorn, formerly the Commission Legal Service's monetary expert, wrote Legal Arrangements in the Treaty of Amsterdam for the Effectiveness of the Economic and Monetary Union, 31 COMMON MKT. L. Ruv. 263
(1994). My own contribution is RogerJ. Goebel, EuropeanEconomic and Monetary Union:
Will the EMU Ever Fly?, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 249 (1998).
40. The Social Protocol and the implementing provisions of the accompanying
Social Agreement, agreed to by all the Member States except the United Kingdom, are
annexed to the Treaty on European Union (but will disappear after the entry into force
of the Treaty of Amsterdam). For excellent analyses, see Philippa Watson, Social Policy
After Maastricht,30 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 481 (1993), and Elaine Whiteford, Social Policy
After Maastricht, 18 EUR. L. REv. 202 (1993). For a detailed analysis of the EC Treaty's
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dom to enact employee rights and other social action measures
by a form of qualified majority voting. This unusual structure
has worked well in practice, yielding several legislative measures
that bind all the Member States of the Community except for
the United Kingdom.4" After the election of the Labour Government of Prime Minister Blair in May 1997, the United Kingdom
has accepted all of the legislation adopted through use of the
Social Protocol. Moreover, as Mr. Venturini's article indicates,
the final sessions of the Turin Intergovernmental Conference revised the social policy chapter of the EC Treaty to enable most
future employee rights legislation to be adopted by co-decision,
thus abolishing the peculiar mechanism of the Social Protocol.
Although the Maastricht Treaty on European Union made
many other significant changes in institutional structure and in
the scope of different fields of action of the Union (e.g., formally adding the spheres of environmental protection, consumer rights, health, education, and culture),42 the final important modifications that link to the subsequent discussion of the
Treaty of Amsterdam are the TEU's emphasis on the protection
of human rights and the creation of European Citizenship.
Article F(2) of the TEU makes a solemn declaration:
The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by
the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of
Community law.43
social chapter and the legislative measures adopted under it, see my own contribution,
Roger J. Goebel, Employee Rights in the European Community: A Panoramafrom the 1974
Social Action Program to the Social Charterof 1989, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1
(1993).
41. See Council Directive No. 94/45/EC of 22 September 1997 on the establishment of a European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings
and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees, O.J. L 254/64 (1994); Council Directive No. 96/46/EC of 3 June
1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded by UNICE, CEEP, and
the ETUC, OJ. L 145/4 (1996).
42. EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 130r-130t, 129a, 129, 126, 128, OJ. C 224/1, at
46-52 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 660-72 (arts. 130r-130t, 129a, 129, 126, and 128 of
EC Treaty will be renumbered as arts. 174-176, 153, 152, 149, and 151 of Consolidated
EC Treaty, respectively).
43. TEU, supra note 2, art. F(2), O.J. C 224/1, at 6 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
728 (art. F(2) of TEU will be renumbered as art. 6(2) of Consolidated TEU).
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Although the Court of Justice has committed the European
Community to the protection of basic economic, social, and personal human rights in a variety of contexts ever since the start of
the 1970s," Article F(2) represents the first Treaty articulation
of this obligation to protect fundamental human rights. Article
F(2)'s language essentially replicates the Court's doctrinal formulation of the principle. Article F(2) is a declaration of constitutional principle and as such has a higher normative value than
the more detailed European Council's 1978 Declaration of Democracy, referred to above. However, a peculiar-and perhaps
inadvertent-feature of the TEU is that the Court ofJustice, pursuant to Article L, does not have jurisdiction to enforce Article
F(2) .
The Maastricht Treaty also amended the EC Treaty to introduce Article 8, which creates a "citizenship of the Union," and
Article 8a, which sets forth certain rights of citizens of the
Union.4 6 The most important of these is the "right to move and
reside freely" within the Community,4 7 but also mentioned are
the right to vote for the European Parliament and in local elections in the State of residence,4" and to petition the European

44. Among the most prominent cases in the Court of Justice's doctrinal development of its protection of fundamental human rights are InternationaleHandelsgesllschaft,
Nold, Rutili, and Hauer. See Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und
Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, [1972]
C.M.L.R. 255; Nold v. Commission, Case 4/73, [1974] E.C.R. 491, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R.
338; Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, Case 36/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1219, [1976] 1
C.M.L.R. 140; Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727, [1980] 3
C.M.L.R. 42.
45. Article L of the TEU sets out the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and does
not include Article F of the TEU within itsjurisdiction. TEU, supra note 2, art. L, O.J. C
224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 738 (art. L of TEU will be renumbered as art.
46 of Consolidated TEU). As noted below, the Treaty of Amsterdam's modification to
Article L of the TEU will give the court jurisdiction "with regard to actions of the institutions" over Article F(2) of the TEU. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 1(13),
O.J. 340/1, at 23-24 (1997) (replacing art. L of TEU); see Consolidated TEU, supra note
2, art. 46, O.J. C 340/2, at 170 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 77 (art. L of TEU).
46. EC Treaty, supra note 2, arts. 8, 8a, O.J. C 224/1, at 10-11 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 593 (art. 8 and 8a of EC Treaty will be renumbered as arts. 17 and 18 of
Consolidated EC Treaty).
47. Id. art. 8a(1), O.J. C 224/1, at 11 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 593 (art. 8a(1)
of EC Treaty will be renumbered as art. 18(1) of Consolidated EC Treaty).
48. Id. art. 8b, O.J. C 224/1, at 11 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 593-94 (art. 8b of
EC Treaty will be renumbered as art. 19 of Consolidated EC Treaty).
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Parliament or the Community Ombudsman.4"
After this all too cursory survey of the principal modifications made by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, let me
make some final comments on the genesis of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
IV. ON THE ROAD TO THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM
Although the Treaty of Maastricht constituted the most substantial change in the Treaties to date, the Parliament and some
Member States felt that further modifications ought to have
been made. Accordingly, Article N(2) of the TEU mandated the
calling of another Intergovernmental Conference (or "IGC") in
1996 to examine further revisions.5" The principal area of possible revision was seen to be in the scope of the co-decision procedure. Article 189b(8) of the EC Treaty foresaw that the 1996
IGC might widen the scope of the procedure, acting on the basis
of a Commission report.5 1 Article B of the TEU5 2 also foresaw
that the "policies and forms of cooperation" in the second and
third pillars, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs, might be revised.
In hindsight, the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union were too optimistic in setting the date of 1996 for
the next IGC. The ratification of the TEU proved far more arduous and took much longer than expected, so that the TEU only
went into effect on November 1, 1993. Moreover, in 1993-1995
the attention of the Community institutions and the Member
States was concentrated upon the negotiations for the accession
of Austria, Finland, and Sweden and upon the preparatory steps
in the creation of Economic and Monetary Union. The modifi49. Id. art. 8d, 0.J. C 224/1, at 11 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 594 (art. 8d of EC
Treaty will be renumbered as art. 21 of Consolidated EC Treaty).
50. TEU, supra note 2, art. N(2), 0.J. C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
739 (art. N of TEU will be renumbered as art. 48 of Consolidated TEU, but art. N (2) of
TEU, now superfluous, will disappear).
51. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189b(8), 0J. C 224/1, at 66 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 695 (art. 198b of EC Treaty will be renumbered as art. 251 of Consolidated
EC Treaty, but art. 189b(8) of EC Treaty will disappear).
52. TEU, supra note 2, art. B, 0.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 727
(art. B of TEU will be renumbered as art. 2 of Consolidated TEU). This fundamental
article on the objectives of the European Union will be somewhat reworded in Article 2
of the Consolidated TEU after the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the text's reference to
possible revisions in the second and third pillars will be deleted.
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cations eventually agreed upon in the Treaty of Amsterdam
might have been more far-reaching had the Intergovernmental
Conference been held a year or two later.
In any event, the European Council and the institutions
were determined that the IGC should be well-prepared. The European Council created a Reflection Group5 3 in June 1995, consisting of two senior representatives from each Member State,
chaired by Ambassador Carlos Westerdorp of Spain (currently
the European Union's representative in Bosnia, overseeing the
peace efforts there). In an extraordinary step, the European
Council invited two representatives of the Parliament to participate in the Reflection Group's work, an invitation that Parliament eagerly accepted in an effort to influence the Reflection
Group toward greater amenability to further democratization of
the institutions. Each of the Community institutions, including
for the first time the Court of Justice, was also requested to provide a report with observations on the functioning of the institutions and possible further Treaty changes.
The Reflection Group provided its report, A Strategy for Europe,5 4 to the Madrid European Council in December 1995,
which made considerable use of it in setting the initial agenda
for the 1996 IGC. (The Madrid European Council also took several key decisions on the timetable for progress toward Economic and Monetary Union and the creation of the euro as a
single currency in 2002, and deliberately omitted the EMU provisions of the Treaty from review in the 1996 IGC.) 55 The Turin
European Council on March 29, 1996,56 set the formal agenda
for the IGC, laying stress upon 1) preparations for the future
enlargement to include Central European states, 2) bringing the
Union closer to its citizens, notably by restructuring the Cooperation in Home and Justice Affairs, 3) making the institutions
more democratic, efficient, and transparent, especially by widening the scope of co-decision and examining the modes of Coun53. Cannes European Council, Conclusions on the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 6,
at 16 (1995).
54. E.U. BULL., no. 12, at 9 (1995).
55. The Madrid European Council decisions are set forth in European Union Bulletin. Madrid European Council, Conclusions on the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 12, at
24-28 (1995). For a summary, see Goebel, supra note 39, at 309-10.
56. Turin European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 3, at 9
(1996).
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cil voting, and 4) strengthening the external relations capacity of
the Union, especially by improved procedures and structure in
the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
The Intergovernmental Conference 5 7 opened on March 29,
1996, in Turin (hence its common designation as the "Turin
IGC") and presented a draft treaty to the Amsterdam European
Council in June 1997, thus working for slightly more than a year.
The Commission, under the leadership of President Jacques
Santer and Commissioner Marcelino Oreja, was naturally very
much involved in the IGC debates and in its drafting process.
Jean-Claude Piris, Director-General of the Council Legal Service,
acted as the Legal Advisor to the IGC. The Parliament followed
closely the evolution of the debates and drafting, providing its
views regularly. Although the Court of Justice remained apart,
its 1995 report undoubtedly weighed heavily in any IGC consideration of the Court's role and jurisdiction.
Naturally, the IGC work in the period of April through June
1996 under the Italian Presidency of the Council could only be
largely preparatory in character. The Irish Presidency, July 1-December 31, 1996, proved to be highly effective in shaping the
debate and striving to make progress on the drafting of text in
areas where agreement could more easily be reached, while
identifying the key issues and arguments on the more thorny
questions. At the Dublin European Council in December
1996,5" the Irish Presidency presented an excellent draft treaty,
which considerably helped to shape the final text (and which
many commentators consider to be superior to the final text in
some respects).
By an interesting coincidence, the Dutch Presidency supervised the final stages of the Turin IGC in the first half of 1997,
just as it had those of the Rome IGC in the fall of 1991. The
Dutch Presidency was intent on making as much progress as pos57. An Intergovernmental Conference ("IGC") is composed of authorized representatives from each Member State, assembled to review possible Treaty amendments
pursuant to Article 0 of the TEU. TEU, supra note 2, art. 0, O.J. C 224/1, at 99 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 739 (art. 0 of TEU will be renumbered as art. 49 of Consolidated
TEU). An ICC functions through frequent, sometimes almost daily, meetings of experts who do the preparatory work and initial drafting, together with regular (usually
bi-weekly) meetings of representatives at the ministerial level who decide the more important issues and agree upon the final text.
58. Dublin European Council, Conclusions on the Presidency, E.U. BULL., no. 12,
at 12-13 (1996).
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sible. It is believed to have been particularly effective in enhancing the, role of the Parliament and in achieving the substantial
"communauterization" of the Cooperation in Justice and Home
Affairs. However, much of the IGC efforts to reach a consensus
during the period from January to April was blocked by the intransigence of the United Kingdom's Major Government, which
clearly sought to make political capital in the U.K. elections from
its resistance to further augmentation of EU scope or power.
With the dramatic overwhelming victory of the Labour Party,
which left the new Blair Government ample negotiation room,
considerable progress was made in May-June, most notably on
the insertion of the new Social Chapter and the Title on Employment. However, time pressure now took its toll on the discussions. Despite valiant efforts, the IGC was unable to reach agreement on the thorny issues of the size and composition of the
Commission and on the mode of a new form of qualified majority voting in the Council, both critical to facilitating future enlargement by the accession of a large number of relatively small
countries (except for Poland). The Amsterdam European
Council of June 16-17, 1997, resolved some outstanding issues,
usually through the mode of complex Protocols, and, after some
sprucing up over the summer, the Treaty of Amsterdam5 9 was
signed on October 2, 1997.
It is not the purpose of this brief introduction to analyze or
even to describe meticulously the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The symposium authors do so with great authority and
expertise. It is, however, useful to set out a road map of the
principal features of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
In terms of institutional structure and operations, undoubtedly the most important achievement of the Treaty of Amsterdam is the modification of the co-decision procedure to put the
Parliament on a par with the Council 6° and to add new legislative fields to those in which the co-decision procedure is used. 1
59. The principle features of the Treaty of Amsterdam are outlined in EUROPEAN
1997, at 9-12
(1998).
60. Compare Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(44), OJ. C 340/1, at 46
(1997) (replacing art. 189b(6) of EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13,
art. 251(6), OJ. C 340/3, at 280 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 129 (art. 189b(6) of EC Treaty),
with EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 189b(6), O.J. C 224/1, at 66 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 695.
61. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2, O.J. C 340/1, at 26-48 (1997)
COMMISSION, GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcrMTIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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The cooperation procedure will now disappear-except in the
sphere of Economic and Monetary Union. Based on Parliament's own proposal, Article 137 of the EC Treaty will now set a
maximum ceiling of 700 Members of Parliament, 62 which means
that the size of present Member State delegations will have to be
reduced when Central European countries are admitted and receive their delegations of MEPs.
The Commission, Council, and the Court ofJustice will only
be modestly affected by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Commission President's authority is to be augmented; Article 163 of the
EC Treaty will require that the Commission "work under the
political guidance of its President. ' 63 The Council will use qualified majority voting in a number of new fields (though none are
of primary importance). The Court of Justice will receive jurisdiction in cases interpreting and applying those aspects of the
Cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs that are being transferred to Community competence. 64 The possible use of EU institutions when some, but not all, Member States wish to cooperate more intensively in particular fields of action is covered in
65
new Treaty provisions on flexibility.
As noted above, the initial symposium articles by Messrs.
Piris, Maganza, Petite, Brinkhorst, and formerJudge Due all deal
(amending extending co-decision procedure under art. 189b of EC Treaty to arts. 6,
8a(2), 51, 56(2), 57(2), 73o, 75(1), 109r, 116, 118(2), 119(3), 125, 127(4), 129(4),
129d, 130e, 130i(]), 130o, 130s(1), 130w(1), 191a(2), 209a(4), 213a(1), and 213b(1) of
EC Treaty); see Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, arts. 13, 18(2), 42, 46(2), 47(2),
67, 71 (1), 129, 135, 137(2), 141(3), 148, 150(4), 152(4), 156, 162, 166(1), 172, 175(1),
179(1), 255(2), 280(4), 285(1), 286(1), O.J. C 340/3, at 185, 186, 194, 196, 196, 203-04,
205, 236, 238, 239-40, 242, 244, 245, 247, 249, 251, 252-53, 254, 255, 257, 282, 293, 294,
294 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 82, 82, 86, 87, 87, 91, 92, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114,
115, 115-16, 116, 117, 118, 130, 136, 136, 136 (arts. 6, 8a(2), 51, 56(2), 57(2), 73o,
75(1), 109r, 116, 118(2), 119(3), 125, 127(4), 129(4), 129d, 130e, 130i(1), 130o,
130s(1), 130w(1), 191a(2), 209a(4), 213a(1), and 213b(1) of EC Treaty).
62. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1,art. 2(37), OJ.C 340/1, at 43 (1997) (inserting art. 137, 1 2 into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 189,
2, O.J. C 340/3, at 260 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 119 (art. 137,
2 of EC Treaty).
63. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(41) O.J. C 340/1, at 44 (1997) (inserting art. 163,
1 into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 219,
1,O.J. C 340/3, at 269 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 124 (art. 163,
1 of EC Treaty).
64. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(15), O.J. C 340/1, at 31 (1997) (inserting art. 7 3 p into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 68, O.J. C
340/3, at 204 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 91 (art. 7 3p of EC Treaty).
65. See, e.g., Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 1(12), OJ. C 340/1, at 22-23
(1997) (replacing tit. Via, arts. K.15-K.17 of TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 11, tit.
VII, OJ. C 340/2, at 169-70 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 77 (tit.
Va, arts. K.15-K.17 of TEU).
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expertly with the modifications that the Treaty of Amsterdam
will make to the institutions' structure and operations.
With regard to the scope of action of the European Community, some expansion and increased emphasis has been given
in the fields of the environment,6 6 health, 67 consumer protection," and culture.69 Far more important are the new Social
Chapter 70 and the Title on Employment,7 both well-described
by Patrick Venturini. Another major development is the gradual
transfer of the sectors of visas, asylum rights, immigration, and
controls on external frontiers to the Community from the prior
intergovernmental procedures in the third pillar, Cooperation
injustice and Home Affairs.72 These complicated provisions are
reviewed to some degree by the authors mentioned above.
Ongoing efforts to promote the principle of subsidiarity led
to a protocol on subsidiarity,7 3 largely replicating the well-known
7
1992 Edinburgh European Council declaration on the subject.

4

Similarly, the principle of transparency will receive Treaty force
with a new Article 191a of the EC Treaty granting Union citizens
and enterprises a "right of access" to Parliament, Council, and
Commission documents. 75 The symposium article of Christian
66. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(34)-(35), O.J. C 340/1, at 42 (1997)
(amending arts. 103r and 130s of EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13,
art. 174-75, OJ. C 340/3, at 254-56 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 116-17 (art. 129 of EC Treaty).
67. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(26), O.J. C 340/1, at 39-40 (1997)
(replacing art. 129 of EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 152, O.J.
C 340/3, at 246-47 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 112-13 (art. 129 of EC Treaty).
68. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(27), O.J. C 340/1, at 40-41 (1997)
(replacing art. 129a of EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 153, O.J.
C 340/3, at 247-48 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 113 (art. 129a of EC Treaty).
69. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(25), OJ. C 340/1, at 39 (1997)
(amending art. 128 of EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 151, OJ.
C 340/3, at 245-46 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 112 (art. 128 of EC Treaty).
70. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(22), OJ. C 340/1, at 35-39 (1997)
(replacing arts. 117-120 of EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 13643, OJ. C 340/3, at 239-46 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 109-11 (arts. 117-20 of EC Treaty).
71. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(19), OJ. C 340/1, at 33-35 (1997)
(inserting tit. VIa into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, tit. VIII, O.J.
C 340/3, at 235-36 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 107 (tit. Va of EC Treaty).
72. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(15), OJ. C 340/1, at 28-32 (1997)
(inserting it. Ilia into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, tit. IV, arts.
61-69, O.J. C 340/3, at 200-05 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 89-91 (it. lila of EC Treaty).
73. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, O.J. C 340/1, at 105 (1997).
74. Edinburgh European Council, Conclusions on the Presidency, 25 E.C. BULL.,
no. 12, at 9-10 (1992).
75. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(45), 0.1. C 340/1, at 46 (1997) (in-
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Timmermans expertly analyzes this development, and Laurens
Jan Brinkhorst's article provides his critique of the evolution of
the principle of transparency.
The Treaty of Amsterdam also places a greater emphasis on
rights protection, notably through the insertion of a new Article
F.1 of the TEU that enables the Council, acting in its composition of Heads of State or Government, to assess penalties on
Member States that violate the principles of democracy, rule of
law, and basic rights.7 6 Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty will expand the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in Article L of the
TEU to cover claims that Community institutions have violated
fundamental rights. 7 Also potentially of high importance is the
new Article 6a of the EC Treaty, which will empower the Council
to adopt measures to "combat discrimination based on sex, social or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual
orientation. '"78

In the field of external trade relations, the Amsterdam
Treaty amendment to Article 113 of the EC Treaty represents
only a compromise effort at a solution to the vexing question of
whether the Community should speak for the Member States in
the fields of international financial services and intellectual
property.7 9 Similarly, the relatively modest improvement in decision-making in the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the
creation of the post of a High Representative in that field reflect
compromise positions.'s All of these developments are carefully
serting art. 191a into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 255, O.J. C
340/3, at 282 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 130 (art. 191a of EC Treaty).
76. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 1(9), O.J. C 340/1, at 9 (1997) (inserting art. F.1 into TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 11, art. 7, O.J. C 340/2, at 153
(1997), 37 I.L.M. at 69 (art. F.1 of TEU).
77. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 1(13), O.J. 340/1, at 23-24 (1997) (replacing art. L of TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 11, art. 46, O.J. C 340/2, at 170
(1997), 37 I.L.M. at 77 (art. L of TEU).
78. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(7), OJ.C 340/1, at 26 (1997) (inserting art. 6a into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 13, O.J. C
340/3, at 185 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 82 (art. 6a of EC Treaty).
79. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 2(20), O.J. C 340/1, at 35 (1997) (inserting art. 113(5) into EC Treaty); Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 13, art. 133(5),
OJ.C 340/3, at 238 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 108 (art. 113(5) of EC Treaty).
80. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art. 1(10), O.J. 340/1, at 15 (1997) (inserting art. J.16 into TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra note 11, art. 26, O.J. C 340/2, at
161 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 73 (art. J.16 of TEU); Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, art.
1(10), O.J. 340/1, at 13 (1997) (replacing art.J.8(3) of TEU); Consolidated TEU, supra
note 11, art. 18(3), O.J. C 340/2, at 159 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 72 (art. J.8(3) of TEU).
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THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM

analyzed by Ambassador Paemen and Messrs. Bourgeois and
Maganza.
Efforts to simplify the treaties resulted in the deletion of a
number of obsolete provisions8 1 and the rather controversial decision to renumber all the articles of the Treaty on European
Union and the EC Treaty.8 2 Although undoubtedly beneficial in
promoting ease in understanding in the long term, the renumbering will create considerable confusion for practitioners, academics, and students in the short term.
The process of Treaty revision and the evolution in the European Union is ever ongoing. The failure to reach agreement
on key institutional issues in the Turin IGC resulted in a Protocol on the Institutions with the Prospect of Enlargement of the
European Union,8 3 which mandates another Intergovernmental
Conference at least one year before an enlargement that carries
the European Union to twenty-one or more Member States. Inasmuch as the current negotiations are with six applicant States,
another IGC is highly probable in the near term future, perhaps
around 2001-2002. Giorgio Maganza discusses this possible enlargement in his final article. Thus, while the Treaty of Amsterdam marks another important step in the constitutional development of the European Union, its historical evolution is far from
complete.

81. Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 1, arts. 6-11, O.J. C 340/1, at 58-78 (1997).
82. Id. art. 12, O.J. C 340/1, at 78-79 (1997).
83. Id., Protocol on the institutions with the prospect of enlargement of the European Union, O.J. C 340/1, at 111 (1997).

